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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS: BALANCING HUMAN RIGHTS AND
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY*

Danilo Tiirk
Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs
United Nations

Chancellor Touhill, Professor Glassman,**
Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen,

It is both necessary and exciting to discuss the issues of human rights in a global
perspective. The title of my presentation today suggests a strong emphasis on those
situations involving massive violations of human rights and resulting humanitarian
disasters which may justify the use of force by states. This is, of course, a vitally
important aspect, but it has to be seen in the context of the broader picture of human
rights, a picture which reveals important developments affecting the fate of the individual
in a changing world.

In his Nobel lecture delivered in Oslo on 10 December 2001, the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations expressed his belief that in the 21 st century:
"[the] mission of the United Nations will be defined by a new,
more profound awareness of the sanctity and dignity of every
human life, regardless of race or religion. This will require us
to look beyond the framework of States, and beneath the surface
of nations or communities. We must focus, as never before, on
improving the conditions of the individual men and women who
give the state or nation its richness and character".
* The views expressed in this lecture are personal views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the
UN.
**Dr.Blanche M Touhill, Chancellor, University of Missouri-St. Louis, and Dr. Joel Glassman, Associate Vice
Chancellor for Academic Affairs and Director, Center for International Studies, University of Missouri-St. Louis.
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This is a powerful statement and one calling for innovation in international
politics. It envisions a strong movement away from a State-centered approach to an
approach based on the recognition of the centrality of the human person in global affairs
- a truly visionary concept. But is this approach a revolutionary one? I do not believe so
-it can build upon the achievements made as a result of the paradigm which emerged in
the aftermath of World War II. At the normative level, that new paradigm was expressed
in such instruments as the United Nations Charter (1945), the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (1948), the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (1948) and the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of Victims of War
(1949). These documents have directed international attention to the fate of human
beings as individuals and human groups, away from the traditional, State-centered
concept of international politics. Much of what is being done today and, indeed, the
Secretary-General's pleadings in Oslo, are a part of a long-term effort to give a real
meaning and political content to the ideas which emerged in the wake of global
conflagration more than half a century ago.

Human Rights: an Era of Implementation

Human rights entered the global scene with the adoption of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 as a part of the new international order established
in the post-World War years. Like the UN Charter three years earlier, the Universal
Declaration was adopted with the motivation to prevent a future descent into the
barbarism of war. The horror of war and the imperative to prevent a recurrence of the
holocaust were the primary motivating reasons for the international codification of
human rights and were a major factor for their acceptance.

This existential motivation for international codification of human rights was
complemented by the optimism of the time which was expressed in the belief that human
rights are universal.
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The question of whether human rights are truly universal has been open from the
very beginning. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was not adopted
'

unanimously. The debate over the universality of human rights continues, and has
reached one of its peaks in recent years. Objections are based either on the argument of
cultural diversity or on various types of philosophical scepticism regarding the idea of
human rights itself.

However, the objections raised to the universality of human rights have not
weakened the meaning of human rights themselves. The fact that human rights are
needed is historically established and ascertainable in all parts of the world, across
religious and civilizational fault lines. Individuals need and claim basic human rights in
various ways throughout the world in order to protect their lives and basic freedom
needed for human existence.

Another factor helping to make human rights less vulnerable to cultural diversity
and philosophical differences regarding their universality is the fact that human rights
have become a part of international law. Human rights are accepted and promulgated by
UN declarations and in a number of multilateral agreements concluded among states.
International law, however imperfect and underdeveloped, strengthens the legitimacy of
human rights and diminishes the relevance of sceptical views about their philosophical or
cultural or religious underpinnings. The importance of the international legality of
human rights may be sometimes underestimated, but it can no longer be ignored.

The following two pillars are essential: the need for human rights expressed in all
parts of the world and their international legal enactment. They established a sufficient
foundation allowing us to address the practical problems of human rights in the global
context which rest, for the most part, in the realm of implementation.

The problems of implementation of human rights are diverse and lie both in the
realms of law and politics.
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The legal character of human rights is not only a strength, it brings with it some
inherent weaknesses. One of them is the very normative nature of human rights
processes.

All legal norms, including human rights norms have three essential dimensions:
descriptive, prescriptive and constitutional. Each norm contains a description of the real
life situation it intends to address, a prescription regarding the desired or prohibited
behaviour and, finally, an identification of the norm's position in the hierarchy oflegal
norms. The latter, i.e. "constitutional" dimension, is defined by the content of the norm
in question and by the level of its abstractness. General legal norms require further, more
specific norms in order to make implementation possible. Human rights norms are
powerful in their content as basic; i.e., constitutional, norms. However, many among
them require further, specific norms containing more detailed descriptive and prescriptive
content for their implementation. Human rights norms such as the right to fair trial (Art.
10 of the UDHR), the right to privacy (Art. 12 of the UDHR), or the right to work (Art.
23 of the UDHR) are examples of such rights. This legal feature of international human
rights norms points to the importance of the implementation, which requires further legal
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elaboration of norms, especially of their descriptive content. It also requires coherent
jurisprudence and consistency in other practices intended to give real life to abstract
norms.

This process takes place in a specific social, political and cultural context.
Implementation of human rights most often involves conflicting claims. Management of
such conflicting claims is the essence of the implementation of human rights, a
circumstance which explains why the role of non-governmental organizations is critical
for human rights implementation.
Implementation takes place within the legal system of a given country and within
its own social context. The actual reach and political effect of internati9nal decisionmaking in the field of human rights is still very limited, except when, as for example in
the case of the European Court of Human Rights, the international decisions create a

5

direct effect within the legal order of the state party to the European Convention on
Human Rights. Most other international decisions for the implementation of human
rights have an indirect effect, and require some form of action by the Government of the
state concerned. This is an important characteristic of human rights implementation
today - and one which testifies to the continued relevance of state sovereignty in matters
of human rights.

I shall return to the issue of sovereignty shortly. Before that, however, I need to
mention some of the current challenges to the implementation of human rights at the
international level. This is necessary because legal and political complexity of
implementation also characterizes international action.

Issues of implementation have represented a major part of the international human
rights agenda since the beginning. They have gained in importance since the completion
of the basic codification of human rights about a decade ago. The World Conference on
Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993 and establishment of the post of the High
Commissioner on Human Rights later that year is probably the most visible milestone in
the transition towards implementation as the essence of the international human rights
effort. There are, in my opinion, four major areas of international implementation of
human rights which require priority, now at the beginning of the new century and the new
millennium. Two of them are traditional and two are new.

First, the implementation mechanisms established long before 1993, which have
developed their own procedures and methodologies should be strengthened. Treatybased monitoring systems involving the work of expert bodies are a typical example.
These mechanisms require an ever stronger secretariat support, an aspect which is
sometimes neglected but one that continues to be a priority.

Second, some other traditional mechanisms, such as the system of country
rapporteurs appointed by the Commission on Human Rights, need to be improved.
Serious reporting on country situations based on thorough knowledge and analysis of
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facts and on compelling arguments on the measures to be taken to improve the situation
of human rights in a particular country is a basic type of human rights work.
Furthermore, sometimes reports of this kind serve as early warning and as a potential
instrument of conflict prevention. For this potential to be properly developed, the reports
need to deal not only with the violations of human rights per se, but also with their social
and political context and must not shy away from making policy recommendations. Not
all reports currently produced in the framework of the Commission of Human Rights are
of the same quality and further improvement is needed: in some cases in assuring
accuracy in the analysis, and in others in enriching the contextual aspect of the reports, or
in making the policy recommendations more specific.

Furthermore, there are methods of implementation of human rights which are
relatively new and require particular attention. One of these are human rights field
operations - such as monitoring offices and human rights segments in the UN peace
operations. The soon to be established International Criminal Court is another novelty.

Human rights field operations require special attention at the present stage of
development of an international strategy to implement human rights. They are usually a
part of a broader peace-building or, sometimes, conflict prevention strategy. Such a
strategy requires a thorough and comprehensive diagnosis of the problems at hand, a
realistic programme of action, adequate means and the necessary technical skills. These
are heavy requirements and all of them apply to human rights as well as to other
segments of the operation. Concrete tasks such as the establishment of an independent
judiciary or a credible electoral system or a free media require both a good "human rights
compass" and a variety of technical skills and means to make a real contribution to the
improvement of the human rights situation. Where do human. rights discussions end and
technical work start? Ensuring the necessary technical sophistication is a major challenge
of human rights implementation in such situations.
The International Criminal Court which will probably be established before the
end of this year will present another type of issues.

7

The Court and its jurisprudence are expected to bring a number of novelties to the
international system. The most important among them will be the new balance between
national and international jurisdictions for genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes. The Statute of the Court (Article 15) stipulates the right of the Prosecutor to
initiate an investigation proprio motu. In its decision on admissibility (Article 17) of
cases brought before the Court at the initiative of the Prosecutor, the Court will have to
determine whether the initiative is admissible as a result of state's unwillingness or
inability to genuinely carry out the investigation and prosecution. In other words, the
Court will function on the basis of the principle of complementarity of the jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court with the national criminal jurisdiction.

The principle of complementarity of jurisdictions strengthens the responsibility of
states to do, within their jurisdictions, what is necessary for the prosecution of the most
serious crimes. Should states be unable or unwilling to carry out their responsibility, the
Prosecutor and the International Criminal Court would have the opportunity, essentially,
to take their role. It appears reasonable to assume that the "sword of Damocles" of the
International Criminal Court will contribute not only directly but also, and perhaps even
more importantly, indirectly to the greater effectiveness of International Criminal Law,
thus strengthening the international regime of human rights. One of the consequences of
the construction of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal court was the
reaffirmation of the basic impo~ance of state sovereignty. The Court's statute represents
the evolution of law and sovereignty rather than a revolutionary change.

Human rights and State Sovereignty

The quoted examples are among the most pertinent issues on the contemporary
agenda of international implementation of human rights. At the same time they are also
among the more interesting illustrations of the situation of state sovereignty at this point
in time. Taken together they demonstrate that sovereignty of states continues to be
important for the implementation of human rights. Furthermore, they show that state
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sovereignty continues to be molded by the evolution of international law, very much in
the manner known from previous periods in history. The gradual expansion of the
domain of international law continues while the scope of domain reservee of sovereign
states continues to be modified by this evolution. This does not necessarily imply a
diminution of state sovereignty - a state which implements the basic norms of human
rights, which cooperates internationally and is willing and able to prosecute war criminals
based on her own sovereign will is not likely to be adversely affected by the evolving
international mechanism. Moreover, there is a vast area of human rights implementation
which remains within the realm of the sovereignty of states.

This point needs to be made strongly for at least two reasons. First, traditional
human rights advocacy has focused on threats to human rights originating from the
holders of state power. The emphasis of protection of human rights against the state was
historically justified and conceptually sound. However, it did not address all threats to
human rights. Recently the international community has witnessed atrocities which take
place in situations of collapsed states and the resulting armed conflicts. State sovereignty
has become appreciated as a firewall against anarchy and resulting abuses of human
rights. Second, the period of uncritical fascination with globalization and the views of
sovereignty as an "outdated concept" which has allegedly "spent its historical energy"
seems to be coming to its end.

In a recent collection of essays titled "Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry",
Michael Ignatieff wrote:

"[Yet] it is utopian to look forward to an era beyond state
sovereignty. Instead of regarding state sovereignty as an outdated
principle, destined to pass away in the era of globalization, we
need to appreciate the extent to which state sovereignty is the
basis of order in the international system, and that national
constitutional regimes represent the best guarantees of human
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rights". (M. Ignatieff: Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry,
Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2001, p. 35).

The above quotation, which has been left in the said collection of essays
remarkably uncontested, sounds almost Westphalian in its tone. But is it historically and
conceptually correct and does it suggest movement forward?

State Sovereignty: the Need for a Proper Understanding

In my opinion the answer to both these questions is yes, provided that the concept
of sovereignty is properly understood. State sovereignty has historically established itself
as a fundamental political and legal concept - but not as an absolute one. Sovereignty is
not an absolute and, above all, not the only relevant legal and political concept. It is
important to distinguish sovereignty as the supreme authority which is necessary for the
.

.

political community to exist and the absolutist uses and interpretations of sovereignty
which have been characteristic of much of the twentieth century and which have added to
serious problems of human rights. Now, in the new century and after the chaotic ending
of the previous one, we should be able to appreciate better the core meaning and
importance of sovereignty as a basic organizing principle of states and of the
international system..

State sovereignty properly understood is not static. The frontiers of sovereignty
and the modalities of its implementation change with time and with the obligations the
State has under international law. Sovereignty is found in newly independent and highly
independence-conscious states as well as in states extensively integrated in an
international legal sub-system such as the European Union. The contexts of state
sovereignty are diverse and its content is relatively indeterminate. It is through
international law that we discover the exact scope of sovereignty. Of course it is
necessary to assume, as the Permanent Court of International Justice stated in the Lotus
case (1927), that a state is free and its sovereignty unfettered in absence of clear legal
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obligation. But in areas such as human rights or those set out by the UN Charter, the
scope of sovereignty is defined by obligations into which a state has freely entered. Such
obligations confer upon states a duty to abide by law and to behave responsibly so as not
to violate their legal obligations.

It is particularly important to stress the link between sovereignty and
responsibility. The reason for this is historical. Much of the debate about sovereignty
that has taken place since the establishment of the United Nations centered on
sovereignty as a right of states and on the equality among sovereign states. This is
understandable because the newly independent states which formed the majority of the
UN' s membership emphasized their own priorities - i.e. their need to establish
themselves in the international community as free and equal with other states. This
political need has shaped much of the UN' s discussions during the first fifty years of its
existence. Now, at a time when the UN-led codification of international law has created
a densely knit web of international obligations for states, it is much more important to
understand that sovereignty carries with it responsibilities and that responsible exercise of
sovereign rights is essential for international stability. The responsible exercise of
sovereignty includes the respect for internationally accepted human rights as well as
positive action by states when this is necessary for implementation of these rights.

State Sovereignty and Non-Intervention

In no other area are the problems of sovereignty more fundamental than in the
area expressed by the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of sovereign states.
Logically, sovereign states are equal and therefore protected against all forms of
intervention in their own affairs by other states. Prohibition of intervention is a logical
corollary of the fundamental principle of sovereignty of states. But it is precisely here
that the most serious dangers of an absolutist interpretation and use of state sovereignty
may arise. Can sovereignty be used as a shield for gross violations of human rights? The
answer, advocated by Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the UN, and by many others
is a resounding no. Ways must be found to address such violations and stop their
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occurrence. Might these ways include the use of force by other states and international
organizations in certain conditions and under certain rules? In certain circumstances,
probably, yes. These are, at present, the most important questions concerning state
sovereignty.

Before addressing these core questions I wish to make a short digression into
history with the aim of shedding light on the evolution and the current status of the
principle of non-intervention under international law.

As a corollary of state sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention belongs to
old principles of international law. And, like sovereignty, it has, from the very
beginning, not been considered as an absolute principle. The principle was explicitly
formulated in the eighteenth century in the work _of Christian Wolff ( 1679-17 54) and
Emmerich de Vattel (1714-17 67) both of whom recognized that under certain
circumstances the "international community" (civitas maxima in the works of Wolff and
community of nations in the work of Vattel) may intervene against a sovereign who
threatens the international community. This approach established a degree of dualism:
the principle of non-intervention is recognized but so are the exceptions from this
principle in certain circumstances. The subsequent development of international law
practice and doctrine specified those exceptions which by the end of the nineteenth
century included humanitarian intervention.

This basic legal approach was not uniform: the lists of possible exceptions varied
from one major author to another, and, above all, so did the practice of great powers that
were in the position to decide whether to intervene or not. Legal principles and power
politics mixed, not always to the advantage of international law. Humanitarian
intervention in various parts of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century were
accompanied by the geopolitical interests of the intervening and other major powers.
Selectivity and lack of consistent practice were among the problems. Generally,
intervention can be undertaken only by more powerful states against weaker ones, and
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political considerations have been always part of the decision whether to intervene or not
to intervene.

In Latin America the experience with different types of foreign intervention gave
rise to powerful doctrines of non-intervention, advocated by Argentinian jurists and
diplomats Carlos Calvo (1824-1906) and Louis Maria Drago (1859-1921) and later in the
1930s by Genaro Estrada, the Foreign Minister of Mexico. The legal instruments
adopted in the Inter-American framework in 1930s and 1940s developed a strict noninterventionist model.

Given this diverse historical background, the authors of the Charter of the UN
adopted a realistic and wise approach. In its Article 2, paragraph 7 the Charter prohibited
intervention by the UN (and therefore, a fortiori by individual Member-States of the UN)
in "matters which are essentially within domestic jurisdiction" of states and defined one
exception: the Security Council may act against a threat to the peace in accordance with
its powers under chapter VII of the Charter. This was a realistic framework, made in a
form and content allowing for further evolution. It was expected that states would further
define their sovereignty through the future evolution of international law, which is
constantly changing the scope of "matters which are essentially within domestic
jurisdiction" of states. The Security Council was expected to decide which situations,
including those arising from internal problems, constitute threats to the peace and
therefore justify international intervention.

In subsequent years, however, the evolution of international law and state practice
took a specific course. The Security Council became paralysed owing to Cold War
divisions and deliberative organs of the UN became increasingly influenced by the newly
independent states that gradually became a majority in the 1960s. These states - being
both new and not firmly established - were strongly interested in the use of the UN as an
additional layer of protection of their new and precious sovereignty. As a result, nearabsolutist interpretations prevailed - a trend also favoured by the socialist camp which
advocated strong statehood for reasons of ideology and the political needs of their ruling
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regimes. This trend produced a near-absolutist interpretation of the principle of nonintervention which found its expression in the Declaration of Principles of International
Law on Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, in accordance with the UN
Charter, adopted in 1970 (GA resolution 2625 [XXV]). The relevant passage of that
Declaration reads:

"No state or a group of states has the right to intervene, directly
or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or
external affairs of any other state. Consequently, armed
intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted
threats against the personality of the state or against its political,
economic and cultural element, are in violation of international
law". (emphasis added)

This formulation, which bears more signs of the Latin American historical
experience and legal tradition than that of Western European legal thought and practice,
was adopted by consensus and was, like the Declaration as a whole, accepted as
reflection of customary international law.

The tendency of a near-absolutist interpretation of the principle of nonintervention continued in subsequent years. Consensus, however, was not maintained
and a resolution detailing the prohibited practices of intervention (GA resolution 36/103)
was adopted in 1981 by a vote signalling the limits of the tendency which had prevailed
in the previous period. Further changes took place in the 1990s with the ending of the
Cold War, the collapse of the socialist system and the dramatic weakening of nonalignment both as a concept and-a political movement. The general political context
started to change and the international community gradually became receptive to a more
nuanced approach.

This change in the global political environment coincided with humanitarian
disasters of Rwanda (1994) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1994-1995), and in Kosovo
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(1999). The occurrence of genocide and its variant, "ethnic cleansing", put on the
agenda, once again, the question of whether the international community should
intervene militarily to prevent or stop humanitarian disasters or not, and if it should,
under what conditions. The UN Secretary-General used his opening speech at the 54th
session of the General Assembly (1999) to put this question before the Organization's
membership. By clearly placing the moral question of whether state sovereignty should
. be allowed to shield massive violations of human rights, the Secretary-General took the
courageous step of taking the debate on this issue to a new level.

The Security Council, meanwhile, had to face practical emergencies - in Kosovo,
in Sierra Leone and in East Timor. Although its practice has not been coherent, one
could say that the Security Council recognized, if only implicitly, that situations do arise
in which military action must be taken as a result of "extreme necessity" - very much in
the same way that might be legally acceptable under national law. The question of
criteria for the assessment of such situations, and of authorization have not been
answered yet. The debate continues and needs to evolve if an international consensus on
these difficult and sensitive, but also very basic, issues is to be established.

Is there a case for an international standard on the use of force by states in
humanitarian crises?

We are now in the midst of a debate and one should not presume that firm and
precise conclusions are possible yet. Nevertheless, some guidance can be derived both
from UN documents and from authoritative statements made outside the UN, in
particular, from the recent report of the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty, initiated by the Government of Canada and published in December
2001.

First, the criteria. In 1999, prior to his speech in the General Assembly, the
Secretary-General issued a report to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in
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Armed Conflict (doc. S/1999/957 of 8 September 1999). In that report (paragraph 40), he
identified five factors which the Security Council ought to consider in deciding on an
enforcement action which might become necessary in the face of massive and ongoing
abuses. They are:

"(a)

The scope of the breaches of human rights or violations of international
humanitarian law including the numbers of people affected and the nature
of violations;

(b)

The inability of local authorities to uphold legal order or identification of
their complicity;

(c)

The exhaustion of peaceful or court-based efforts to address the situation;

(d)

The ability of the Security Council to monitor actions that are undertaken;
and

(y)

The limited and proportionate use of force with attention to repercussions
upon civilian populations and the environment."

These criteria make sense both in political and legal terms. However, they are
not, at least yet, enacted in the form of law. Nor is the)evel of agreement around these
criteria sufficient to suggest that there exists an international customary standard
governing the resort to enforcement action in the case of a humanitarian disaster.

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty reached a
very similar and clearly formulated set of conclusions. In its report (December 2001 ), the
Commission emphasized that military action is justified - as an exceptional and
extraordinary measure. The "just cause threshold" must be high. Only when a largescale loss of life or ethnic cleansing takes place or is apprehended, military intervention
becomes justified.

Furthermore, the Commission also spelled out the following "Precautionary
Principles":
- Right intention (the intention to halt or avert human suffering);
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- Last resort (non-military options have already been explored, with reasonable
grounds to believe that lesser measures would not succeed);
- Proportional means and
- Reasonable prospect of success.

The two quoted, recent documents suggest that it might be possible to develop an
internationally credible concept on the use of military force to stop or avert a major
humanitarian disaster "as an exceptional and extraordinary measure". The main elements
are already offered. They can be further refined, with the understanding that the
decision-making bodies and, in particular, the Security Council, will have to make a
separate judgment in every single situation. The suggested elements represent a broad
framework of guiding principles for future decision-making. However, they cannot be
interpreted as clear legal prescriptions, something they are not and cannot be as yet.
Clearer consensus, confirmed by actual practice, needs to emerge.

A future consensus on these guiding principles need not be sought through an
abstract and formalized discussion in the UN General Assembly. A case by case
approach, based on specific decisions of the Security Council and in accordance with the
Security Council's powers under the Charter could be a more realistic and productive
approach.

Such an approach brings to the forefront additional questions. Assuming that
there is an agreement about the general criteria guiding the Security Council's action,
how does the Security Council ensure coherence in its practice? When is the best
moment to act? What should happen when the Council members cannot agree on the
desired course of action? Should an unauthorized action by regional organizations or
groups of states, or by individual states, be deemed acceptable in certain circumstances?

The discussion on these issues is only at an early stage and it is related to crisis
situations recently dealt with by the Security Council,whose practices are sometimes less
and sometimes more controversial. The unauthorized military action of ECOMOG (an
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ECOWAS force) in Sierra Leone in February 1998 was not controversial. NATO
military action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over the humanitarian crisis in
Kosovo in 1999, on the other hand, was more controversial. In both cases, the Security
Council acted ex post facto and adopted resolutions which defined the approach of the
UN for the future. One could argue that this type of Security Council action amounts to
an implicit rendering of legality to the international action as a whole since the
consequences of the preceding action have now been accepted. But I am sure that there
are different opinions among the legal experts and among the political decision makers.
on this issue. My own opinion, however, is that NATO military action against FRY in
1999 met the criteria of extreme necessity. Furthermore, the situation in Kosovo it
intended to address, had been clearly recognized, in Security Council resolution 1199
·(1998), as a threat to international peace, which implies a need for effective action. And
finally, the situation which developed after the military action became the subject of the
Security Council's decision-making and is now clearly within the framework of legality.

At the general level of discussion, the International Commission on International
· State Sovereignty offered an interesting approach. It proposed that in cases where the
Security Council rejects proposals for action or fails to act, the alternative options are:

"I. consideration of the matter by the Genernl Assembly in Emergency Special

Session under the "Uniting for Peace" procedure; and

II. action within area of jurisdiction by regional or sub-regional organizations
under chapter VII of the Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent authorization
from the Security Council". (emphasis added)

The suggested approach represents an innovation, insofar as it adds the word
"subsequent" to the word authorization. While the prevailing interpretation of the
Charter suggests the requirement of prior authorization, the quoted approach seems to
suggest a shift of the balance in favour of the regional organizations.
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This leads to one of the central issues of the Charter's system of maintenance of
peace and security. Chapter VIII offered a delicate and somewhat uneasy balance with a
favour to a global as opposed to a predominantly regional approach to the issues of
international peace and security. That balance came as a result of intense discussions in
Dumbarton Oaks (1944) and in San Francisco (1945), a discussion which did not end
with the adoption of the Charter. Regional organizations were established and have
grown since the adoption of the Charter in many, although not in all, regions of the
world. They have gained new roles and additional importance in the post-Cold War
period. An effect of this evolution on the overall balance between the UN and the
regional organizations is therefore expected. However, it would be politically unwise and
legally problematic if this change weakened the UN. Working in partnership, and within
the legal framework of the UN Charter, is perhaps one of the most important needs both
for the UN and for the regional organizations in the field of maintenance of peace and
security.

Partnership necessarily involves dialogue and a shared sense of responsibility.
This would have to mean that both the UN and the regional organization need to address
an incipient problem early on and to prevent violent conflict, if possible. Should the use
of military force become necessary, they must act in a manner compatible with the
primary responsibility of the UN for international peace and security. However, primary
responsibility does not mean exclusive responsibility. If the UN manifestly fails to act
when it should have acted, a regional organization might have to fill the gap.

Partnership and division of labour between the UN and regional organizations and
other actors becomes particularly important in those situations in which it is difficult to
generate the political will and resources necessary for action. In many situations, the case
of Rwanda in 1994 being the most dramatic example, the questions of political will and
resources represent the real obstacles to action in situations that had been recognized as a
humanitarian crisis affecting international peace and security. The UN alone may not be
able or fully prepared to act. Initiatives of regional organizations or individual states,
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ready to work in partnership with the UN and carry a part of the burden are a vital
ingredient in such situations. As the examples of operation Alba in Albania (1997) and
East Timor in 1999 show, such awareness, and action based on it can lead to results,
although not without difficulty or sacrifice.

The need to generate political will and mobilize the necessary resources often
represents the most important task in the international action to avert or stop a major
humanitarian disaster. The critical question in such cases is not so much how to ensure
legality of international action, including military action, but how to convince states to
act at all in a situation where the need and legality of action are already recognized. Two
elements of a general nature seem to be essential in the process of generating political
will and mobilizing the necessary resources.

First, the realization that international action serves the enlightened national
interest of states as well as the international community as a whole. While there are no
ready-made prescriptions available, it is obvious that the national interest should not be
articulated only with reference to the most immediate needs of the states concerned but
also with an understanding of the long term needs a~ well as the necessity to avoid even
more serious problems in the future.

The second element is the set of universal moral imperatives, crystallized in the
public conscience and legally enacted in international law. International law is not only a
set of regulations, but also a moral guide necessary for the survival of the international
community and for the prosperity of its members. It guides both restraint and action and
calls for the latter when the threat of a humanitarian disaster becomes real.

In Conclusion
Any serious discussion on human rights, state sovereignty and the use of force
intended to avert or stop humanitarian disasters involves a fundamental ethical issue: that
ofresponsibility. Human rights are a necessary guarantee for the well-being of
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individuals within groups and within a society as a whole. Individuals pursue their rights
- in the vast majority of situations responsibly - taking into account the equal rights of
others and the needs of society as a whole.

The role of the state is essential in the need to ensure respect for and, as the case
may be, also active action for the realization of human rights. The last decade of 20th
century has demonstrated that war and chaos mete out the worst and most massive
violations on human rights. Hence the renewed realization of the important role of the
state. But in order to play such a role, the state has to meet the standards of responsibility
as defined in the international human rights law. This is an inherent part of sovereignty
itself.

Sovereignty is not absolute and includes respect for its legal limitations. In the
past, as well as in many cases at present, very serious abuses of human rights have
originated from the state. That danger continues. At the time of the current, strengthened
effort against terrorism, it is realistic to expect that threats to human rights will not come
only from terrorists but also, and in some cases, perhaps, primarily from states which will
try to take advantage of counter-terrorism to "settle accounts" with those whom they see
as politically dangerous or subversive. Counter-terrorism could be a comfortable refuge
for human rights violators. Once again, the international community will have to
demonstrate vigilance and distinguish legitimate struggle against terrorism from abuse of
state power. This will be a critical test of the responsible exercise of state sovereignty
and of the responsibilities of the international community.

Finally, the responsibilities of the international community are also gaining in
number and in importance. The evolution of international actions in the field of human
rights has created standards of responsibility which need to be applied internationally to
ensure respect for and the realization of human rights. These standards will have to be
strengthened and refined at the time when counter-terrorism is becoming a major
international priority.
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A particularly important aspect of international responsibility relates to the need
to protect potential and actual victims of humanitarian disasters. That responsibility
belongs primarily to states but also, and not less important, to the institutions of the
international community, especially the United Nations. The responsibility to protect
may, in particular circumstances involve the need to use military force. In such
situations, it is essential to reach a broad international consensus about the existence of
that need, the political will to act and the necessary resources. In such cases, state
sovereignty cannot be legitimately and credibly invoked as a shield against international
action. When states abandon their own sovereign responsibility to protect human lives
against a large-scale and man-made humanitarian disaster, or even worse, they
themselves become the source of such a disaster, they deprive themselves of the
protection of sovereignty and international action becomes legitimate.

All these aspects of responsibility are among the ingredients of the vision
"focused on improving the conditions of individual men and women who give the state or
nation its richness and character" - as the UN Secretary-General emphasized in his Nobel
Lecture in December 2001. Such a vision cannot be fully realized as a short term
objective. Neither is the effort to make it a reality entirely new.· But it appears that the
current century is starting with a well-developed set of concepts and norms as well as
instruments for their realization, and above all, with a greater sense of responsibility than
in earlier periods, which gives reasons to hope that real improvement is possible.

***

APPENDIX A

